

Atomos Limited

Revenue growth compressed by coronavirus

Atomos produced strong 1H revenue, but at a lower than expected gross and EBITDA margin than anticipated. More importantly, AMS updated on the impact of coronavirus on the supply chain and product releases. The release of Neon, already delayed from a late-2019 release, has been delayed further into late FY20, leading us to downgrade growth forecasts for 2H20 materially. We remain encouraged by the sector thematic and Atomos' position in the market, but these product delays and product discounting strategy likely impact perception of business quality. Following downgrades to our forecasts, our price target falls to \$1.50 per share. Given the valuation upside and temporary nature of the coronavirus impact, we remain positive, but move to a Speculative Buy.

Coronavirus impacts production and product releases

AMS highlighted minimal impacts attributable to COVID-19 (Coronavirus) to the core product range to date, with built-up inventory late in 2019 helping negate supply chain troubles. However, AMS has not been completely unscathed with its new Neon product which had already been delayed from a late-2019 release to early-2020, now delayed until 4QFY20. Current production capacity is only ~30% of its prior level, but management are hopeful two additional factories will be operational by 4QFY20. We remain cautious on the 2020 outlook given the unknowns of production ramp up and product release timing.

Discounting drives gross margin lower

Discounting in the wake of an inventory rush following resolution of a component supply issue saw 1H20 revenue come on at a reduced gross margin. GM was further impacted by US/China tariffs (now 7.5%, was 15%). We now believe GM will remain around 44% in the medium-term as the business looks to stimulate demand following release and production delays.

Valuation and recommendation

While the delays to production and release of Neon are disappointing, these issues are temporary. We prefer to look long into the social and entertainment markets where Atomos is still underpenetrated. Following adjustments to our modelling, our target falls from \$1.75 to \$1.50.

| Key Financials | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Year-end July (\$) | FY18A | FY19A | FY20E | FY21E | FY22E |
| Revenue (\$m) | 35.6 | 53.7 | 67.0 | 88.0 | 106.0 |
| EBITDA (\$m) | 0.2 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 8.1 | 12.1 |
| EBIT (\$m) | (0.1) | 0.2 | (0.9) | 3.1 | 6.9 |
| Reported NPAT (\$m) | (15.6) | (2.0) | (0.6) | 2.2 | 4.9 |
| Reported EPS (c) | (9.6) | (1.2) | (0.3) | 1.1 | 2.5 |
| Normalised NPAT (\$m) | (1.9) | (0.7) | (0.6) | 2.2 | 4.9 |
| Normalised EPS (c) | (1.2) | (0.4) | (0.3) | 1.1 | 2.5 |
| EPS Growth (%) | - | - | - | - | 118.0 |
| Dividend (c) | - | - | - | - | - |
| Net Yield (%) | - | - | - | - | - |
| Franking (%) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | - | - | - | 21.9 | 14.3 |
| Normalised P/E (x) | - | - | - | 95.0 | 43.6 |
| Normalised ROE (%) | - | - | - | 3.3 | 6.9 |

Source: OML, Iress, Atomos Limited

Last Price

A\$1.09

Target Price

A\$1.50 (Previously A\$1.75)

Recommendation

Speculative Buy (Prior Buy)


Risk

Higher

Computer Hardware

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| ASX Code | AMS |
| 52 Week Range (\$) | - |
| Market Cap (\$m) | 202.4 |
| Shares Outstanding (m) | 186.6 |
| Av Daily Turnover (\$m) | 0.0 |
| 3 Month Total Return (%) | -36.0 |
| 12 Month Total Return (%) | 41.8 |
| Benchmark 12 Month Return (%) | 9.9 |
| NTA FY20E (¢ per share) | 15.0 |
| Net Cash FY20E (\$m) | 22.4 |

Relative Price Performance



Source: FactSet

Consensus Earnings

| | FY20E | FY21E |
|-----------------|-------|-------|
| NPAT (C) (\$m) | 2.1 | 4.4 |
| NPAT (OM) (\$m) | (0.6) | 2.2 |
| EPS (C) (c) | 0.1 | 1.9 |
| EPS (OM) (c) | (0.3) | 1.1 |

Source: OML, Iress, Atomos Limited

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1H20 result overview

- AMS reported revenue of \$32.6m for the half, up 35% on pcp and 1.4% ahead of OMLe. This was driven by the core product range, with no large-scale product releases in the HY. This was achieved with no product releases and some component supply chain issues.
- Gross margin % declined over the period by 0.7% pts and largely driven by “a short-term component shortage in FYQ2’20 causing delays in production of core product lines”. We note that the margin compression was largely attributable to US/China tariffs and the rush of supply (once the component was fixed) leading to some discounting. We note a current sale of Ninja V for US\$649 vs the usual price of ~US\$699.
- Costs were slightly higher than anticipated at both the COGS and opex lines leading EBITDA to miss OMLe by 25% and GP by 2%. Nevertheless, both lines grew 33-37% on pcp. We note 1H20 excludes rental costs from opex on the adoption of AASB16.
- Guidance provided over the COVID-19 outbreak was relatively constrained with management stating:
 - To result date, there have been minimal impacts to the core selling product range attributable to COVID-19 as sufficient stock levels were built up prior to the CNY holiday. However, they do note that new products have seen some delays.
 - “Assuming all factories return to normal production in the near term, and normal market trading resumes, Atomos does not expect any significant impact to the core product lines.”
 - “Atomos expects the two other factories will start coming back on-line shortly and are fully operational in FYQ4’20.”
 - The virus is likely to impact key trade shows, buying activity and product releases

The table below shows an overview of the result:

Figure 1 – Result overview

| | 1H19a | 2H19a | FY19a | 1H20a | %Δ pcp | 1H20e | %Δ OMLe | 2H20e | FY20e |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| Sales revenue | 24.2 | 29.5 | 53.7 | 32.6 | 34.6% | 32.2 | 1.4% | 34.4 | 67.0 |
| COGS | -13.7 | -16.2 | -29.9 | -18.7 | 36.1% | -18.0 | 3.9% | -18.8 | -37.5 |
| Gross profit | 10.5 | 13.3 | 23.8 | 13.9 | 32.5% | 14.2 | -1.8% | 15.6 | 29.5 |
| Total expenses (ex-D&A) | -9.8 | -12.4 | -22.2 | -13.0 | 32.2% | -12.9 | 0.7% | -13.9 | -26.9 |
| EBITDA | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 36.5% | 1.3 | -25.6% | 1.6 | 2.6 |
| D&A | -0.6 | -0.9 | -1.5 | -1.6 | 179.5% | -1.4 | 10.8% | -1.9 | -3.5 |
| EBIT | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | -0.6 | -511.4% | -0.1 | 413.6% | -0.3 | -0.9 |
| Net interest | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.0 | -0.2 | 131.8% | 0.0 | 9041.3% | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| PBT | 0.1 | -0.2 | 0.2 | -0.8 | -1439.3% | -0.1 | 687.6% | 0.0 | -0.9 |
| Tax | -0.2 | -0.7 | -0.8 | -0.3 | 76.6% | 0.0 | -884.9% | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Normalised NPAT | -0.1 | -0.9 | -0.7 | -1.1 | 1071.0% | -0.1 | 1476.4% | 0.5 | -0.6 |
| Normalised EPS | -0.06 | -0.54 | -0.39 | -0.58 | 925.8% | -0.05 | 1152.6% | 0.24 | -0.32 |
| Gross margin | 43.4% | 45.1% | 44.3% | 42.7% | -0.7%pts | 44.1% | -1.4%pts | 45.3% | 44.0% |
| EBITDA margin | 3.0% | 3.1% | 3.1% | 3.0% | 0.0%pts | 4.1% | -1.1%pts | 4.7% | 3.9% |

Source: OMLe and AMS *pcp is pre-AASB16, 1H20, 2H20 and FY20 are post-AASB16

Changes to forecasts

- We have reduced revenue and COGS forecasts to account for new product production delays and reduced gross margins
- We have increased our D&A to reflect accounting changes (AASB 16)

Figure 2 – Changes to forecasts

| | FY20 old | FY20 new | %Δ | FY21 old | FY21 new | %Δ | FY22 old | FY22 new | %Δ |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Social | 8.6 | 5.6 | -35.0% | 12.9 | 12.3 | -4.7% | 17.4 | 16.6 | -4.7% |
| Pro Video | 53.3 | 47.2 | -11.5% | 64.0 | 56.6 | -11.5% | 75.2 | 66.5 | -11.5% |
| Entertainment | 14.9 | 14.1 | -5.6% | 18.7 | 17.6 | -5.6% | 22.4 | 21.2 | -5.6% |
| Other/Timecode | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0% | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.0% | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.0% |
| Sales revenue | 77.0 | 67.0 | -13.0% | 97.1 | 88.0 | -9.3% | 116.7 | 106.0 | -9.2% |
| COGS | -42.3 | -37.5 | -11.3% | -53.0 | -49.3 | -7.1% | -63.5 | -59.4 | -6.5% |
| Gross profit | 34.7 | 29.5 | -15.0% | 44.0 | 38.8 | -12.0% | 53.3 | 46.7 | -12.4% |
| Other revenue | 0.0 | 0.0 | na | 0.0 | 0.0 | na | 0.0 | 0.0 | na |
| Total expenses | -29.4 | -26.9 | -8.6% | -34.2 | -30.6 | -10.5% | -38.7 | -34.5 | -10.7% |
| EBITDA | 5.3 | 2.6 | -50.8% | 9.8 | 8.1 | -17.0% | 14.6 | 12.1 | -17.0% |
| D&A | -3.0 | -3.5 | 16.7% | -4.5 | -5.0 | 11.1% | -4.7 | -5.2 | 10.6% |
| EBIT | 2.3 | -0.9 | -139.9% | 5.3 | 3.1 | -40.8% | 9.9 | 6.9 | -30.2% |
| Net interest | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25.9% | 0.1 | 0.1 | 18.3% | 0.1 | 0.1 | -4.1% |
| PBT | 2.3 | -0.9 | -137.7% | 5.4 | 3.2 | -40.2% | 10.0 | 7.0 | -30.0% |
| Tax | -0.7 | 0.3 | -137.7% | -1.6 | -1.0 | -40.2% | -3.0 | -2.1 | -30.0% |
| Normalised NPAT | 1.6 | -0.6 | -137.7% | 3.8 | 2.2 | -40.2% | 7.0 | 4.9 | -30.0% |
| Normalised EPS | 0.9 | -0.3 | -137.7% | 1.9 | 1.1 | -40.2% | 3.6 | 2.5 | -30.0% |

Source: OML and AMS

Comparable companies

- The below table shows comparable EV/EBITDA, PEs, EPS growth and PE/Growth ratios for a range of large market opportunity IP/Brand/Device companies. Our comparable set is ASX listed.

Figure 3 – Comparable companies

| Large market opportunity IP/Brand/Device | | | | EV/EBITDA | | PE | | EPS Growth | | PEG | |
|--|-----------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Code | Company | Price Last | Mkt Cap AUD | FY21 | FY22 | FY21 | FY22 | FY21 | FY22 | FY21 | FY22 |
| PNV AU | PolyNovo Ltd | 1.93 | 1,273 | 129.5 | 64.3 | 160.4 | 77.0 | 1100% | 108% | 0.15 | 0.71 |
| EOF AU | Ecofibre Ltd | 2.73 | 860 | 18.0 | 12.5 | 29.4 | 20.1 | 102% | 46% | 0.29 | 0.43 |
| BWX AU | BWX Ltd | 4.48 | 557 | 18.6 | 15.7 | 28.7 | 23.6 | 24% | 22% | 1.21 | 1.08 |
| BUB AU | Bubs Australia Ltd | 0.98 | 535 | 61.5 | 26.0 | 61.3 | 28.8 | - | 113% | na | 0.26 |
| AD8 AU | Audinate Group Ltd | 7.76 | 526 | 57.8 | 32.4 | 121.3 | 60.6 | 121% | 100% | 1.00 | 0.61 |
| CBR AU | Carbon Revolution Ltd | 3.96 | 504 | 43.9 | 12.7 | 660.0 | 21.8 | - | - | na | na |
| CLV AU | Clover Corp Ltd | 2.80 | 466 | 20.6 | 17.1 | 29.2 | 24.1 | 33% | 21% | 0.88 | 1.16 |
| CAT AU | Catapult Group | 1.65 | 315 | 13.3 | 9.6 | 41.3 | 25.0 | - | 65% | na | 0.38 |
| AMS AU | Atomos Ltd | 1.45 | 271 | 28.6 | 19.9 | 72.5 | 48.3 | 300% | 50% | 0.24 | 0.97 |
| NUC AU | Nuchev Ltd | 3.53 | 159 | - | 41.6 | - | 60.9 | - | - | na | na |
| RDF AU | Redflex Holdings Ltd | 0.52 | 79 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 65.0 | 28.9 | - | 125% | na | 0.23 |
| Average | | | | 39.5 | 23.1 | 126.9 | 38.1 | 280% | 72% | 0.63 | 0.65 |
| Median | | | | 24.6 | 17.1 | 63.1 | 28.8 | 111% | 65% | 0.58 | 0.61 |

Source: OML and Bloomberg *AMS metrics based on OMLe

Valuation & Recommendation

Given the long-dated nature of AMS' growth and its working capital consumptive model, we focus on DCF in deriving a valuation for the business. Rolling this forward, we derive a price target of \$1.50 per share.

Figure 4 – DCF valuation overview

| DCF inputs | | DCF outputs | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Beta | 1.20 | Forecast cash flows (\$m) | 49 |
| Risk free rate | 5.0% | Terminal value (\$m) | 188 |
| Market risk premium | 6.0% | Franking value | 3 |
| Cost of equity | 12.2% | Enterprise value (\$m) | 241 |
| | | Add net cash (FY20e) (\$m) | -22 |
| Debt premium | 4.0% | Equity value (\$m) | 263 |
| Cost of debt (after tax) | 6.3% | Implied equity value (p.s.) | 1.34 |
| | | Rolled fwd at Ke | 12% |
| D/E | 20.0% | Price target | 1.50 |
| WACC | 11.0% | | |
| | | Implied CAGR (FY20-25) | |
| Terminal growth rate | 3.0% | Revenue | 22.5% |
| | | EBITDA | 66.2% |
| | | Implied FY21 PE | 131.3 |
| | | Implied FY22 PE | 60.2 |
| | | Implied FY23 PE | 34.4 |
| | | Implied FY24 PE | 22.4 |

Source: OML

Reiterating the Atomos story

About Atomos Limited

Atomos Limited (AMS.ASX) designs and manufactures monitor-recorders, which can be added to existing video equipment to enhance standard definition camera into high-resolution systems. The monitors can be added to phones, tablets or professional video recorders, allowing for a simpler interface for editing and distributing content.

AMS' main product proposition is to converge computer and video technologies, by combining high-quality recording, monitoring and editing functionality into a low-cost, add-on device for cameras. The portable (in-field) monitor transfers raw images captured by the camera into a proprietary hard drive, which through increased data rates, enhances the quality of the video. The improved user interface of the device allows for more flexible editing and content distribution on the go.

Key Benefits

- Enhanced video quality by connecting directly to a variety of camera sensors. Improves colour and brightness of low-quality images at an affordable price.
- In field monitors introduce slow motion frame rates to standard cameras and elevates 4K definition to high resolution.
- Jointly developed technologies with large camera manufacturers (e.g. Sony) and post production software providers (e.g. Apple). This creates a fully integrated vertical in the market, achieving a seamless workflow from capture, through recording and into post production.
- Increases recording time from minutes to hours using new SSD 2TB hard drive and compressed data capability from codecs such as Apple's ProRes RAW.

Product Mix

Approximately 87% of revenue from monitor recorders. The lower end of AMS product range, including the smaller "Shinobi" and "Ninja V" monitors, target social media content creators. The number of content creators have increased 23% yoy since 2012 (prospectus). Content on these platforms is distributed through free, ad-click driven platforms like Facebook, Instagram and YouTube.

Currently Atomos' predominantly targets the professional camera and video equipment market. The end uses of this segment include promotion, events and corporate video, as well as educational content. In 2018, 81% of US companies used video promotion or training with US\$135B spend in total.

AMS has recently launched its "Neon" range of cinema monitor-recorders targeted at the high-end entertainment industry, an identified growth market. Targeting news/entertainment platforms like Fox, Netflix and Amazon, the Neon range has nearly doubled AMS' product portfolio.

Background


Founded in 2010 and headquartered in Melbourne, the company has grown internationally with eight offices located in five countries, each servicing a key part of the global market. The company's global sales operations are conducted via the German office in Frankfurt. CEO Jeromy Young has over 20 years of tech management experience, holding previous roles as Business Development Manager at Canopus Japan and Blackmagic Design Pty Ltd. The company has significant IP embedded in their proprietary processes, developed in-house by a team of over 30 engineers.

Key Drivers

Key Driver 1 – Growth of Social Video Market

AMS has experienced significant growth in recent years, largely off the back of demand in the social and pro video market segments. The company’s focus on capturing market share in the rapidly growing social media market will be accretive, leveraging existing sales channels. This market, the lower end of Atomos’ product range, constitutes social media content creators. The number of content creators have increased 23% yoy since 2012. Content on these platforms is distributed through free, ad-click driven platforms like Facebook, Instagram and YouTube.

Figure 5: Revenue Growth by segment



Source: Company Data and OML estimates

AMS has already established several other key advantages it can use to expand in these markets, which includes:


- Using the existing Ninja platform to release upgraded products based on the same core technology (reduced R&D costs).
- Leveraging existing sales channels with distributors that can supply to new and extended markets.
- Developing relationships with new camera manufacturers and other market players to attract new demand (prior partnerships have included Sony, Canon & Nikon).

Key Driver 2 – Cinema Product Launches

The Neon range of products, launched in September 2019, are 4K HDR field monitor-recorders for studio production. This is targeted at the cinema segment of the video production industry, with its need to produce premium, high-quality entertainment content. The product family offers four monitors differentiated by size (17"-55"), with prices ranging from \$5,500 to \$25,000 per device. While the new product range will cannibalise some of the existing high-end monitors (Sumo range), we believe the Neon family of products will drive strong sales growth.

We anticipate this product offering to be the focal point of growth in the upcoming year and is consistent with the company’s strategy to expand into the entertainment and social markets, which is estimated have a TAM 10x greater than the pro video market historically. Video streaming platforms have grown astronomically in the last decade; Netflix revenue has increased from US\$1.41B in 1Q14 to US\$5.25B during the same period in 2019. Netflix, Amazon and Apple are expected to grow their combined spend for original content from US\$5B in 2017 to >US\$23B in 2022 (AMS Prospectus). Given these hefty budgets, enhanced quality of content is required to remain competitive within the market.

Figure 6 – Estimated non-sports programming expense 2019



Source: Statista, Moffett Nathanson, Company Reports, <https://www.statista.com/chart/13076/video-content-spending>

Beyond growing the top line, we think the introduction of new product lines will affect both the gross margin and operating margin of the business. While a gross margin of ~45% in FY20e is consistent with companies in the consumer durables sector, we anticipate that the pricing structure of the higher-end Neon products will offer improved gross margin dynamics for the business as these products rise in the mix. While consumers are fairly price sensitive, enterprises with budgets exceeding \$1M are often less focused on price and more focused on technology offering. As sales grow, we also anticipate better rates with the manufacturer for larger orders, which would also be accretive to gross margins. With a richer product mix, we think operating expenses will need to increase to support the anticipated sales growth. We expect sales and marketing costs to grow as the company penetrates the professional market. Engineering costs will also expand in line with the product line up as AMS broadens its reach throughout the eco-system.


Key Driver 3 – Operating leverage

Atomos has invested heavily in opex to bolster internal research and development, marketing and administrative support in recent years which came at the detriment of profitability in FY17 and FY18.

Profitability rebounded strongly in FY19, with an EBITDA margin of 3%, but an incremental EBTIDA margin of ~8%. We expect these overheads investments to incrementally slow going forward, allowing EBITDA margin to expand up toward 20%.

This leverage means we forecast a CAGR in revenue FY19-25 of 22.5% versus an EBITDA CAGR of 63%.

Figure 7 – EBITDA margin and incremental EBITDA margin



Source: OML

Key Driver 4 – Develop Strategic Relationships

AMS aims to evolve its current strategic relationships with global camera manufacturers and major software video editing providers, in order to achieve end-to-end integrated solutions. AMS monitors assimilate with global camera manufacturers, allowing for cross promotion. Further, by achieving a seamless workflow from capture, through recording and into post production, software relationships create an efficient process. The key strategic relationships are below:

Apple

In 2011, CEO Jeremy Young pitched his original Ninja 1 monitor to Steve Jobs. His proposition was recording ProRes directly from the sensor, which launched the strategic relationship with Apple and established credibility for the brand. Last year, AMS was granted a license by Apple for use of its updated recording format, “ProRes RAW”; a codec which creates much smaller video file sizes, while retaining the quality video data rates and editing capabilities. By achieving a seamless workflow from capture, through recording and into post production, ProRes RAW creates an efficient production process for AMS customers.

Adobe

The US manufacturer of computer software enables editing of video directly recording on an AMS device, removing the need for transcoding. This enables windows devices the same access to RAW workflows as IOS, using Adobe Premiere Pro CC or Adobe After Effects CC.

Cannon and Nikon

AMS products integrate with numerous camera manufacturers, including Canon and Nikon. By gaining access to proprietary image processing algorithms, AMS monitors can process colour, brightness, and image clean up. Marketing synergies are also established, with the example of Nikon’s Z6 & Z7 mirrorless cameras being cross promoted with AMS’ Ninja V monitor recorders. This is accretive for AMS, as products are sold with these Japanese cameras, driving monitor sales. Canon and Nikon’s market share is 2nd (36%) and 3rd (24%) in the mirrorless camera market respectively, based on sales figures between Nov 18 and Oct 19.

JVC Kenwood

In 2017 AMS signed a partnership with JVC Kenwood Corporation (JVC), a global Japanese electronics and Camera manufacturer. This agreement specifies JVC may acquire products from AMS, however there is no minimum volumes in the contract. There is also the option, if the requirement arises, for AMS to use JVC production facilities down the track, diversifying production risk for the company.


The two organisations have shared software and hardware technologies including AtomIC (under license), AMS’ first custom built silicon development project, which was licensed to JVC to be used in one or more of their products. These chips provide proprietary low power, high function video capability and are one of AMS’ key in-house proprietary technologies.

Key Driver 5 - Acquisitions

Following its recent \$7.5M capital raise, AMS acquired UK based company Timecode Systems Ltd (TCS). TCS has developed unique IP, which allows multi-device synchronisation of video and audio capture device. This includes any combination of large-scale film cameras, to DSLRs, GoPros and smart phones. This will be accretive for AMS due to the following factors:

- With several patents on the IP, TCS will create a technological advantage for AMS. They now can license this technology to audio and camera companies, should this become the standard within the industry.
- Timecode devices can be accurately synchronised up to 300 meters away, a process which is repeatable so effective at even further distances. At a local level, external devices connect to Timecode products via Bluetooth.
- Market position will be strengthened by the expansion of current core partnerships. TCS products help link numerous devices and they already have established relationships with camera manufacturers.
- Ownership of TCS will enable full integration of the TCS sync technology throughout the AMS product line-up. TCS expected to be earnings accretive in FY21 and we estimate to provide roughly 10% uplift in sale of monitor recorders over the medium term.
- By transitioning to AMS’ supplier arrangements and manufacturing processes, significant cost synergies will result. The company estimates a 30% reduced production cost and sales uplift from leveraging AMS’ distribution channels and marketing.
- TCS is already working on complex multicamera productions with Marvel Studio’s, Amazon Studios and Walt Disney. These relationships will assist with promotion AMS’ existing cinema quality product offerings (e.g. Neon).

Figure 8 – TCS Integration into video and audio markets



Source: Atomos.com

Risks

Higher Input Prices

- AMS cost of revenues will be sensitive to input prices of certain products, including semiconductor chips, LCD panels and memory.
- The memory chip market, mired in a significant downturn throughout 2019, seems to have bottomed out. Inventories are dropping and demand is rising, indicating a brighter year for the sector in 2020.
- The semiconductor market is expected to reach \$573 billion by 2024, with a CAGR of 4.1% from 2019 to 2024. This will likely increase the price of manufacturing for AMS, impacting gross margins in the medium term.

<https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/12/article/after-dire-year-memory-chips-poised-for-strong-2020/>
<https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191007005567/en/Global-Semiconductor-Market-Report-2019-573-Billion>

Increased Competition

There are a range of other companies who produce similar monitor-recorder products in the market. We see competitors as a key risk to medium term growth, but we think this is partially offset by the growing TAM. Amateur content creation is still growing, and with the added product range, AMS can address new markets. Key competitors include, Blackmagic Design, Convergent Design and SmallHD.

AMS faces the risk that:

- Existing competitors could increase their market share through aggressive sales and marketing.
- Customers substitute with these alternative products.
- They may fail to anticipate and respond to changing opportunities or develop new products.
- Customers or strategic partners who purchase from or cross promote, may develop products which compete with AMS.

Macro Risks to Supply Chain

There are certain inputs for which the AMS has a single or limited source of supply. This inherently increases risk in the production process. Specific macro conditions affecting supply chain, including:

- US China trade war
- Hong Kong Protests

Lack of formal written distribution agreements

Given that in the USA a small number of distributors are responsible for 50% of the group's revenue, AMS is materially exposed to this risk. AMS does not have formal written contracts in place with most of its distributors, who order and purchase products on an ad hoc basis with no minimum purchase order obligations. Distributors may decide not to continue buying AMS products, which would have an impact on future revenue. AMS product cannot be bought from any source other than Atomos, however.

Product Obsolescence

The computer industry has very quick rates of product obsolescence, as new designs continue to eat up existing technology. Further, given the monitor recorder industry in which AMS exists is relatively juvenile, the rate of improvement is high. The typical customer cycle for AMS products is 3-5 years.

Remaining at the forefront of technological advancements in the industry depends heavily on the key strategic relationships AMS has in place; Apple, Sony, Nikon, Adobe etc. Were these relationships to break down or these large corporations take a different approach to the sector, AMS' growth prospects would be materially affected.

Atomos Limited

| PROFIT & LOSS (A\$m) | 2018A | 2019A | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
|---------------------------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Revenue | 35.6 | 53.7 | 67.0 | 88.0 | 106.0 |
| Operating costs | (35.5) | (52.1) | (64.4) | (79.9) | (93.9) |
| Operating EBITDA | 0.2 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 8.1 | 12.1 |
| D&A | (0.3) | (1.5) | (3.5) | (5.0) | (5.2) |
| EBIT | (0.1) | 0.2 | (0.9) | 3.1 | 6.9 |
| Net interest | - | (0.0) | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Pre-tax profit | (0.1) | 0.2 | (0.9) | 3.2 | 7.0 |
| Net tax (expense) / benefit | (1.8) | (0.8) | 0.3 | (1.0) | (2.1) |
| Normalised NPAT | (1.9) | (0.7) | (0.6) | 2.2 | 4.9 |
| Reported NPAT | (15.6) | (2.0) | (0.6) | 2.2 | 4.9 |
| Normalised dil. EPS (cps) | (1.2) | (0.4) | (0.3) | 1.1 | 2.5 |
| Reported EPS (cps) | (9.6) | (1.2) | (0.3) | 1.1 | 2.5 |
| Effective tax rate (%) | (1,381.9) | 472.6 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| DPS (cps) | - | - | - | - | - |
| Dividend yield (%) | - | - | - | - | - |
| Payout ratio (%) | - | - | - | - | - |
| Franking (%) | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Diluted # of shares (m) | 163.6 | 166.5 | 188.6 | 197.0 | 197.0 |

| CASH FLOW (A\$m) | 2018A | 2019A | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| EBITDA incl. adjustments | 0.2 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 8.1 | 12.1 |
| Change in working capital | (3.1) | (4.8) | (2.8) | (1.6) | (1.6) |
| Net Interest (paid)/received | (0.4) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Income tax paid | - | (0.2) | 0.3 | (1.0) | (2.1) |
| Other operating items | - | - | - | - | - |
| Operating Cash Flow | (3.3) | (3.3) | 0.1 | 5.7 | 8.5 |
| Capex | (4.4) | (3.1) | (4.3) | (3.9) | (4.2) |
| Acquisitions | - | - | (6.0) | - | - |
| Other investing items | - | - | (6.0) | - | - |
| Investing Cash Flow | (4.4) | (3.1) | (16.3) | (3.9) | (4.2) |
| Inc/(Dec) in borrowings | 1.0 | 6.6 | - | - | - |
| Dividends paid | - | - | - | - | - |
| Other financing items | (0.4) | (2.4) | (1.0) | - | - |
| Financing Cash Flow | 7.6 | 10.1 | 29.0 | - | - |
| Net Inc/(Dec) in Cash | (0.1) | 3.7 | 18.8 | 1.8 | 4.3 |

| BALANCE SHEET (A\$m) | 2018A | 2019A | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
|-------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Cash | 1.4 | 5.1 | 23.9 | 25.7 | 30.0 |
| Receivables | 4.8 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 11.4 | 13.7 |
| Inventory | 6.0 | 9.6 | 13.5 | 16.3 | 19.6 |
| Other current assets | 1.7 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| PP & E | 0.8 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.7 |
| Intangibles | 7.7 | 8.5 | 40.0 | 39.2 | 38.4 |
| Other non-current assets | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total Assets | 22.5 | 35.9 | 91.1 | 97.6 | 106.4 |
| Short term debt | 2.7 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Payables | 8.5 | 10.5 | 12.0 | 16.3 | 20.2 |
| Other current liabilities | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Long term debt | - | - | - | - | - |
| Other non-current liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| Total Liabilities | 11.7 | 12.7 | 15.4 | 19.7 | 23.6 |
| Total Equity | 9.3 | 23.2 | 66.6 | 68.9 | 73.8 |
| Net debt (cash) | 1.3 | (3.6) | (22.4) | (24.2) | (28.5) |

Speculative Buy

| DIVISIONS | 2018A | 2019A | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| KEY METRICS (%) | 2018A | 2019A | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
| Revenue growth | - | 50.7 | 24.7 | 31.4 | 20.4 |
| EBITDA growth | - | 989.4 | 57.7 | 214.1 | 48.9 |
| EBIT growth | - | - | - | - | 120.2 |
| Normalised EPS growth | - | - | - | - | 118.0 |
| EBITDA margin | 0.4 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 9.3 | 11.4 |
| OCF /EBITDA | - | - | - | 80.7 | 86.5 |
| EBIT margin | - | 0.3 | - | 3.6 | 6.5 |
| Return on assets | - | - | - | 2.3 | 4.8 |
| Return on equity | - | - | - | 3.3 | 6.9 |

| VALUATION RATIOS (x) | 2018A | 2019A | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Reported P/E | - | - | - | 95.0 | 43.6 |
| Normalised P/E | - | - | - | 95.0 | 43.6 |
| Price To Free Cash Flow | - | - | - | 42.9 | 27.9 |
| Price To NTA | 102.0 | 12.2 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 5.7 |
| EV / EBITDA | - | - | - | 21.9 | 14.3 |
| EV / EBIT | - | 997.8 | - | 56.6 | 25.1 |

| LEVERAGE | 2018A | 2019A | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| ND / (ND + Equity) (%) | 11.9 | (18.4) | (50.8) | (54.3) | (62.9) |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (%) | 833.8 | (219.6) | (865.1) | (297.2) | (234.8) |
| EBIT Interest Cover (x) | - | 176.0 | 23.0 | - | - |
| EBITDA Interest Cover (x) | - | 1,645.0 | - | - | - |

| SUBSTANTIAL HOLDERS | m | % |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|
| Jeromy Young and family | 17.7 | 9.5% |
| Perennial | 17.4 | 9.3% |
| Domazet | 16.4 | 8.8% |

| VALUATION | |
|------------------------------|-------------|
| Cost of Equity (%) | 12.2 |
| Cost of debt (after tax) (%) | 9.0 |
| D / EV (%) | 20.0 |
| WACC (%) | 11.0 |

| | |
|--|--------------|
| Forecast cash flow (\$m) | 49.5 |
| Terminal value (\$m) | 188.0 |
| Franking credit value (\$m) | 3.3 |
| Enterprise Value (\$m) | 259.9 |
| Less net debt / add net cash & investments (\$m) | (22.4) |
| Equity NPV (\$m) | 237.4 |
| Equity NPV Per Share (\$) | 1.34 |

| | |
|--|---------------------|
| Target Price Method | Rollled forward DCF |
| Target Price (\$) | 1.50 |
| Valuation disc. / (prem.) to share price (%) | 38.1 |

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| | |
|------------------------|---|
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| BUY | The stock's total return (nominal dividend yield plus capital appreciation) is expected to exceed 15% over the next 12 months. |
| ACCUMULATE | We expect a total return of between 5% and 15%. Investors should consider adding to holdings or taking a position in the stock on share price weakness. |
| HOLD | We expect the stock to return between 0% and 5%, and believe the stock is fairly priced. |
| LIGHTEN | We expect the stock's return to be between 0% and negative 15%. Investors should consider decreasing their holdings. |
| SELL | We expect the total return to lose 15% or more. |
| RISK ASSESSMENT | Classified as Lower, Medium or Higher, the risk assessment denotes the relative assessment of an individual stock's risk based on an appraisal of its disclosed financial information, historic volatility of its share price, nature of its operations and other relevant quantitative and qualitative criteria. Risk is assessed by comparison with other Australian stocks, not across other asset classes such as Cash or Fixed Interest. |

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