Mick Ryan on why Ukraine can expect to make further gains against Russia 

IN EARLY SEPTEMBER Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, published an article that explored Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. It was a succinct assessment from the man who has led Ukraine’s defence since Russia’s invasion in February. “There is every reason to believe that [the war] is not going to end anywhere within 2022,” he wrote.

Within days of the article appearing, Ukrainian troops surged out of their assembly areas in north-eastern Ukraine and broke through thinly manned Russian defensive lines. For those who have observed the Ukrainians closely the timing may have been a surprise, but the method was not. From the start of this war, the Ukrainians have surprised the Russians consistently with their competence and tactical ingenuity, attacking their  weak points and forcing them constantly to downgrade their strategic ambitions.

The Ukrainian military strategy might best be described as a strategy of corrosion. The Ukrainians, through indirect attacks, information operations, destruction of Russian logistics and commanders, and tough close combat, have corroded Russian soldiers’ physical, moral, and intellectual capacity to fight. In the war’s initial phase, the Ukrainians did this against the northern Russian expedition, forcing a Russian withdrawal. They are now doing the same in their north-eastern and southern offensives.

There are political as well as military imperatives for the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. Politically, Ukraine’s leaders felt both domestic and international pressure to show that they could seize back their nation. There was a sense that continued support from the West might depend on it. Some in the Ukrainian high command probably thought that while both sides were exhausted, the Russians were more thinly stretched across the country. Perhaps there were opportunities to push back the Russians further, if the right striking points could be found.

By late in the northern summer, the Ukrainians had already launched a campaign to seize back the strategically decisive southern provinces. Throughout August progress had been slow, however. The Russians deployed additional reinforcements to the region. And while the Ukrainians were making progress attacking Russian logistics, commanders and important transport nodes, there was a sense among some observers that the broader war could become another Donbas-like meat grinder.

That all changed last month. On September 6th, the Ukrainians penetrated deep into the Russian defensive lines east of Kharkiv. Over a six-day period, the forces led by General Oleksandr Syrsky recaptured dozens of Ukrainian settlements and forced the Russians to retreat, leaving behind massive quantities of equipment and munitions. Shortly afterwards, the Ukrainians surged across the Oskil River, and by early October had liberated thousands of square kilometres of Ukrainian territory.

On October 2nd, the situation got even worse for Russia. General Andriy Kovalchuk’s forces in the south, having identified several weak points in Russian defensive lines north of Kherson, launched an offensive that quickly broke through them. The Ukrainians, like their compatriots in the north-east, advanced as far south as Dudchany in a matter of days.

These Ukrainian southern and north-eastern campaigns—a one-two punch against Russia—continue to develop. There are several lessons to be drawn from them.

First, the offensives are the result of a series of cleverly orchestrated activities in a unified operational design. The two campaigns are designed to mutually reinforce each other. Operational design is an important aspect in the planning and conduct of large-scale military activities. Competent operational design allows military commanders to sequence the tactical actions of forces in the field to meet strategic and political outcomes. This is a very complicated process, demanding the prioritisation of limited assets such as HIMARS rocket launchers, air support and electronic warfare. Surprise and deception are crucial.

Second, eight months into this war, it is apparent that Ukraine has senior commanders who are seasoned strategists and operational planners. These leaders have the measure of their adversary. They understand how to balance strategic risk and opportunity and are clearly skilled at guiding their subordinates through the planning and execution of campaign-level military endeavours. This is an uncommon proficiency that few military institutions possess. In the Ukrainians, this is founded on their knowledge of Soviet operational theory which has been refined in pre-war NATO training and with battlefield experience.

Finally, the recent Ukrainian campaigns have highlighted the asymmetry in innovation and command philosophies between the Ukrainian and Russian militaries. Ukraine has moved away from Soviet-era approaches and permits its soldiers to innovate and its military leaders the freedom to exploit opportunities. The Russians do not. And they will probably have to further centralise their control once more inexperienced conscripts arrive on the battlefield. This hierarchical rigidity has been a weakness of the Russians that the Ukrainians have consistently exploited.#

The Russian Army continues to reel from Ukraine’s recent counter strokes. The well-led, highly adaptive and tactically competent Ukrainians fight with a purpose not evident in Russian soldiers.  The Ukrainian military has responded in a decisive manner to those pundits who earlier questioned whether they could conduct large-scale offensives. And it is probable that the Ukrainians are carefully watching for further opportunities to exploit. We may see other Ukrainian strikes before winter sets in. The Ukrainian capacity to orchestrate varied, well-led and concurrent military campaigns across their territory, and to orchestrate a campaign for hearts and minds through online platforms and beyond, are a harbinger of other potential conflicts this century. This war is far from over, but Ukraine has developed a mastery of modern war that many others—including the Chinese—will study closely. ■
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Mick Ryan served for more than 30 years in various roles in Australia’s army and the US Joint Staff. He retired as a major general and is now at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, an American think-tank.